Promoting electric vehicle charging infrastructure considering policy incentives and user preferences: An evolutionary game model in a small-world network

Abstract

Because of the fast-growing market share of electric vehicles, the need for charging facilities is growing rapidly. In order to promote the construction of electric vehicle charging infrastructures, the impacts of policy incentives and consumer preferences are analyzed. Balanced subsidy and taxation policies are employed in this paper to improve the economic efficiency while reducing the fiscal pressure of the government. From the aspect of the market, consumer preferences on electric vehicles are modeled in the paper by dividing consumers into three types. In response to the policy incentive, consumers can choose different types of mobility, i.e., electric vehicle or fuel vehicle. The time-varying needs of charging stations and fuel stations in each area are characterized by an evolutionary game model built in the framework of a small-world complex network considering the competitive connections between the stations. The results prove the advantages of the balanced dynamic subsidy and taxation policies on the promotion of electric charging infrastructures. It is noticed that the investment is not the main barrier for the deployment of charging stations. The penetration level of electric vehicles and charging prices are the main driving forces. The findings can provide certain references for policymakers and investment companies.