Abstract
AbstractSynthetic biology is a new, rapidly growing interdisciplinary field which seeks to use engineering techniques to alter and construct new biological components, devices, and systems. The rate of synthetic biology development and research has increased over the past two decades in both industry and academia (Ahteensuu 2017). Applications include medicine (new vaccines, delivery of therapeutics, and treatments), energy (biofuels), environmental remediation, food production, and general industry (detergents, adhesives, perfumes) (Evans and Selgelid 2015; Gronvall 2015). While synthetic biology heralds advances in these fields, its techniques could also be adapted for malicious purposes and used by terrorist organizations, rogue actors, or hostile nations to create dangerous pathogens, invasive organisms, or other disruptive biological agents (Yeh et al. 2012). Such potential makes synthetic biology a dual-use research area of concern (DURC) as the same techniques can be used to benefit or harm people, animals, environments, technology, or nations (Getz and Dellaire 2018). To cope with threats arising from synthetic biology’s dual-use nature, biosecurity is needed to prevent, detect, and attribute biological attacks.
Highlights
Synthetic biology is a new, rapidly growing interdisciplinary field which seeks to use engineering techniques to alter and construct new biological components, devices, and systems
Top-down tripwires include information hazard, as well as internal or external conflict that could motivate a nation to develop and use biological weapons to maintain power, a public health crisis that could cause biosecurity and biosafety regulations to be relaxed in search of a treatment or cure, and geopolitical alignment with a nation of some degree of biosecurity concern
We identify four stages: (1) the indication of an interest in synthetic biology, (2) the achievement of scientific, technological, and engineering capacity for synthetic biology, (3) the development or acquisition of synthetic biology weapons, and (4) the deployment of synthetic biology weapons
Summary
Synthetic biology is a new, rapidly growing interdisciplinary field which seeks to use engineering techniques to alter and construct new biological components, devices, and systems. While synthetic biology heralds advances in these fields, its techniques could be adapted for malicious purposes and used by terrorist organizations, rogue actors, or hostile nations to create dangerous pathogens, invasive organisms, or other disruptive biological agents (Yeh et al 2012) Such potential makes synthetic biology a dual-use research area of concern (DURC) as the same techniques can be used to benefit or harm people, animals, environments, technology, or nations (Getz and Dellaire 2018). In biosecurity, triggering mechanisms that signal when a nation, sub-state actor, or individual is on the path towards biological weapons development and deployment can be part of this response These mechanisms, called tripwires, are actions, events, or breakthroughs that impel a country toward either enabling or moving away from biosecurity threats. Top-down tripwires include information hazard, as well as internal or external conflict that could motivate a nation to develop and use biological weapons to maintain power, a public health crisis that could cause biosecurity and biosafety regulations to be relaxed in search of a treatment or cure, and geopolitical alignment with a nation of some degree of biosecurity concern
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
