Promoting developments of hydrogen production from renewable energy and hydrogen energy vehicles in China analyzing a public-private partnership cooperation scheme based on evolutionary game theory

Abstract

A tripartite evolutionary game model is put forward in this study, which represents the partnership among investment companies (IC), hybrid renewable energy generation system (HREGS) and hydrogen energy vehicle users (HEVU). Aims to determine whether the three parties are willing to participate in different scenarios and find out relevant optimal behaviors to further promote the development of renewable energy hydrogen production and hydrogen vehicles. HRES cooperation needs to meet the requirements that the direct normal irradiance (DNI) is greater than 1615 W/m2, the wind speed is greater than 4.5 m/s, the annual working time is greater than 1800 h, the government subsidy is greater than $152000, and the profit distribution ratio is greater than 0.34. IC cooperation needs to meet the requirements of DNI greater than 1425 W/m2, wind speed greater than 6 m/s, annual working time greater than 1950 h, government subsidy greater than $549000, and profit distribution ratio less than 0.48. HEU cooperation needs to meet the requirements that the government subsidy is more than $29300 and the hydrogenation operation risk cost is less than $2000. This study may provide a reference for renewable energy hydrogen production industry, hydrogen vehicle industry and governments making relevant policies.