Abstract
A simple offer game is considered. Various game theoretic solutions are noted. The results of a series of informal games are noted. Two different solutions are consistently selected by individuals with little game theoretic experience: the symmetric split and the salient point. This raises questions concerning both the Stone and the Schelling ideas on salient points and various normative game theoretic solutions. The deep unanswered question is why two different solutions are selected. What are the tradeoffs and why? Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78. C91
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