Abstract
In December 2003, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya) issued a statement announcing that it had agreed to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Some policymakers in Washington and London were quick to establish connection between Libya's decision and the US-led war in Iraq (2003). Since then, Libya has been presented as a model for other potential proliferators to follow. This article rejects these two propositions. Instead, it argues that the dramatic transition in Libya's stand on WMD can be explained by a cluster of factors — leadership and ideology, economic and political domestic developments, relations with Western powers, and security considerations. The combination of these factors is unique. It is unlikely that the Libyan experience will be repeated in other countries.
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