Abstract
This chapter provides an overview of Part III of the book, which focuses on the principles of culpability and wrongdoing in criminal law. The culpability principle mandates that conviction of a criminal offence, or at least of a stigmatic criminal offence, should not normally occur unless the accused is (morally) culpable with respect to committing that offence. The wrongdoing and culpability principles are intertwined. Paradigmatically, one does not convict defendants of ‘being a criminal’; one convicts them of a named wrong. Ultimately, a full account of culpability in the criminal law demands an account of the relationship between culpability, wrongdoing, mens rea, and defences: and of how the criminal law reflects that; or at least, of how Anglo-American law would reflect that, were it to satisfy the culpability principle.
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