Profitable Coercion: Back on the Agenda?

Abstract

in a narrow sense: as extracted resources less the costs of administration and (p. 31). Costs associated with the broader strategic implications of conquest, such as potential conflicts with third parties, are not included in the balance sheet. Measuring profitability involves calculating the extent to which the economies of the captured nation and the conqueror are cumulative in the sense that resources of the captured nation are added to the conqueror's total economic base. Liberman examines six cases of hostile occupation in detail: Belgium-Luxembourg during World War I, Ruhr-Rhineland 1923-1924, western Europe 19401944, East Germany 1945-1953, the Japanese Empire 1910-1945, and the Soviet-East European Empire 1945-1989. Employing several methods of calculation, Liberman concludes that conquest did indeed pay in most of these cases. Conspicuous successes are the Nazi occupation of western Europe and the Soviet extraction of reparations from East Germany after World War II. Although these results are intriguing, they are based on extremely complex measurement procedures involving a series of assumptions about productivity and the costs of occupation that should be examined carefully by specialists. If one accepts that some conquests might be somewhat profitable, however, then another-more compelling-question comes to the fore: when does conquest pay? Fortunately, Does Conquest Pay? deals much more with this question than its title suggests. Obviously, the extent to which a conqueror would succeed in extracting resources at a low cost depends on the conquered population's will and ability to resist. With the current surge in nationalism, we probably take the will to resist for granted. Likewise, we are inclined to believe that people are not easily subdued in a modern society with a highly specialized workforce. Liberman challenges both of these commonly held ideas. His main argument is that a ruthless conqueror can successfully exploit industrial societies. Unrestricted coercion and repression will, he contends, decrease resistance despite nationalistic feelings, and a modern society might be particularly vulnerable because its centralized system of information and communication can be used to detect and control resistance movements.