Profit Shifting & Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules the Thin Bridge between Corporate Tax Systems

Abstract

At present, controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules are one of the three main anti-tax avoidance laws in developed countries. This paper examines the different CFC rule settings in the OECD and additional countries to show their effects on profit shifting of multinational companies. Using a unique CFC law panel data set for 70 parent countries over 11 years and micro level firm data for over 260,000 companies worldwide, I show that CFC rules lead to up to 19.1% less financial income in foreign low-tax subsidiaries. CFC rules are made up of many distinct characteristics which this study shines light on in order to better understand these laws and their influence on multinational profit shifting. Using bunching at one of the thresholds due to tax avoidance strategies, I calculate shifted profits into foreign low-tax subsidiaries of around 11.67 billion USD as a conservative estimate over the observed time frame. Based on my findings, CFC rules seem to (1) constitute a bridge for territorial tax system countries to counteract profit shifting of multinationals, (2) draw a bottom line for this firm behavior and (3) tax parts of foreign income in a purpose-built way.