Abstract
This paper develops a double-sided moral hazard model to examine the productivity and employment effects of an intensifying profit-sharing scheme. We show that, in order to obtain the productivity-enhancing and employment-expanding effects, a profit-sharing scheme needs a supportive element of true sharing by the employer. If a double moral hazard exists for the worker's effort and the firm's declaration of true profits, a sharing scheme involving larger profit-related pay is not necessarily an effective policy for boosting work morale and employment. However, if the firm-side moral hazard problem is absent, the favorable effects of profit sharing are achieved.
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