Abstract
Networked microgrids (MGs) have several advantages over individual MGs such as reliability improvement and cost reduction. To promote the mutual connection of individual MGs, a rational and predictable profit-sharing rule is required. This study investigates a rule for the fair distribution of profit in networked MGs according to their contributions that come from connecting between them. Cooperative game theory defines profit-sharing problems such as the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) and Shapley value. However, as the two solution concepts are used assuming that the network is complete, they do not account for the positional contribution of each MG in a given network. We propose a variation of the Shapley value designed for an incomplete network, the Myerson value. We investigate how Myerson value-based profit-sharing rule can account for both the role and positional contributions of each MG. Using Korean data, we compare the profit distribution results for the three sharing rules (the NBS, Shapley value, and Myerson value). The result confirms that the proposed rule fairly distributes the profit according to one’s contribution, even when MGs are incompletely connected.
Highlights
Renewable energy has been attracting increasing attention in recent years owing to global warming
COOPERATIVE GAME THEORETIC SOLUTIONS FOR COST SHARING Several cooperative MG planning and profit-sharing rules based on various concepts (e.g., Nash bargaining solution (NBS) [4], Shapley value [22]) have been investigated to encourage cooperative MG planning among networked MGs
We briefly review the two most common cooperative game solutions, NBS and Shapley value, and we introduce the Myerson value, a variant of the Shapley value designed for an incomplete network
Summary
Renewable energy has been attracting increasing attention in recent years owing to global warming. Yoon: Profit-Sharing Rule for Networked Microgrids Based on Myerson Value in Cooperative Game at the planning stage to maximize the profit from this networking. A fair, clear, and predictable profit-sharing rule needs to be designed for networked MGs at the planning stage Such a profit-sharing problem is well defined by cooperative game theory. It uses the Shapley value to identify incentives for each MG; the MGs in the network trade electricity locally with neighboring MGs. Game theory is used to propose electricity exchange between MGs and prosumers [20]. The proposed Myerson value-based rule shares the profit in a fair manner, even when MGs are incompletely connected.
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