Abstract
In this paper, we argue that given that a wage system is preferred to profit-sharing in an insider-outsider model, tax incentives to encourage profit-sharing could be dissipated by the use of cosmetic schemes. The same may also be true in models in which unions care about employment. Hence, we should be cautious about accepting Weitzman's claim that profit-sharing will reduce unemployment.
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