Abstract
Cap-and-trade has become one of the most widely used carbon emission limitation methods in the world. Its constraints have a great impact on the carbon emission reduction decisions and production operations of supply chain enterprises, as well as profit distribution. In the construction supply chain, there are few studies on the profit distribution and emission reduction decisions considering cap-and-trade policy. This paper investigates the profit distribution model of a two-echelon construction supply chain consisting of a general contractor and a subcontractor with cap-and-trade policy. Using game theory and Shapley value method, the optimal emission reduction decisions and profit distribution under three cooperation modes of pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation are obtained, respectively. The research shows that the profits of the construction supply chain are increasing in pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation scenarios, and the emission reduction amount of the construction supply chain in the case of pure cooperation is greater than that of pure competition and co-opetition. The carbon emission reduction amount under the co-opetition scenario is not always greater than that under the pure competition scenario, which depends on the emission reduction cost coefficient relationship of general contractor and subcontractor. When the cost coefficient of emission reduction of the general contractor is less than that of the subcontractor, the emission reduction amount under pure competition is larger than that under co-opetition. A numerical study is carried out to verify the conclusions and illustrated the profits of the supply chain decreased with the increase of carbon emission reduction cost coefficient, and had nothing to do with the emission reduction efficiency of enterprises.
Highlights
With the rapid development of the global economy, the greenhouse effect is increasingly serious and it brings about global warming, extreme weather, rising sea level, and so on [1,2]
Most of the above literature on profit distribution on supply chain is concentrated in the manufacturing industry and few consider the constraints of cap-and-trade policy; the exploration of construction supply chain is rare
We find that the emission reduction of construction supply chain in the case of pure cooperation decision-making is greater than that of pure competition and co-opetition decision-makings, which means that pure cooperation decision-making has the best effect on emission reduction and is more conducive to achieving the emission reduction goal
Summary
With the rapid development of the global economy, the greenhouse effect is increasingly serious and it brings about global warming, extreme weather, rising sea level, and so on [1,2]. There are few systematic studies on the impact of cooperation modes on a supply chain’s decision-making, especially in the field of construction supply chain under the constraints of cap-and-trade policy. The objectives of this paper are to solve the optimal emission reduction decisions and profit distribution of enterprises in the supply chain under the constraints of cap-and-trade policy in different cooperation modes. In this paper, we set up profit distribution models under the constraints of cap-and-trade policy in three scenarios—pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation In this way, it cannot only achieve the profit goals of enterprises, and achieve the goal of reducing emissions by the government. (1) A complete profit distribution model of construction supply chain in pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation under cap-and-trade is constructed, and the optimal emission reduction decisions and profit distribution of construction enterprises are obtained.
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