Abstract
In this paper, agency problems between stockholders and debtholders are considered in a simple model of the firm's optimal production decision. It is shown that in the presence of debt financing other than a production loan, the firm is motivated to underproduce, an agency problem analogous to Myers' classic underinvestment problem. If a production loan is employed in lieu of these other forms of debt, the underproduction problem is rectified.
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