Abstract

Research SummaryGame theory suggests that, in oligopolistic markets characterized by nonprice competition, dominant incumbents can use product proliferation to occupy a region of the product space (i.e., a subspace) and deter rivals from imitating their products. In part, this is because product proliferation makes the introduction of close substitutes comparatively less profitable; in part, it is because the strategy conveys a threat of retaliation to potential imitators. Yet this threat is only credible if the proliferator has high costs of exit from the occupied region of space. We hypothesize that complexity, as a property of product (sub)spaces, generates exit costs for the proliferator and increases the deterrent power of its strategy. We test this hypothesis by studying sequential product introductions in the U.S. recording industry, 2004–2014.Managerial SummaryDifferentiated‐product markets are often concentrated in the hands of a few dominant organizations, which strive to keep on equal footing by offering similar products. In these markets, a product proliferation strategy can help one of the dominant incumbents claim a particular submarket as its territory. Investing heavily in that submarket communicates a threat that the proliferator will retaliate against invaders to protect these investments. However, this threat is not credible enough to deter rivals unless the occupied submarket is sufficiently complex in terms of product attributes, as precisely this kind of complexity makes it harder for proliferators to back down if challenged. We find evidence of this mechanism in an analysis of product competition among major record companies and discuss implications for strategic decision‐making.RESOURCESThis article has earned an Open Data badge for making publicly available the digitally‐shareable data necessary to reproduce the reported results. The data is available at https://github.com/piazzai/smj-18-19552. Learn more about the Open Practices badges from the Center for Open Science: https://osf.io/tvyxz/wiki.

Highlights

  • Product proliferation is the strategy whereby a firm extends its product offer in a market or submarket so as to saturate the product space and minimize unmet demand (Mainkar, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2006)

  • A coefficient of 0.50 corresponds to an incidence risk ratios (IRRs) of e0.50 = 1.65, which implies that a 1-unit increase in the predictor—or a one-SD increase, if the predictor is standardized—leads to a 65% greater probability of new product introduction

  • We find that all predictors except Diversification (IRR = 1.26, confidence intervals (CIs) = [0.63, 2.53]) and MajorSingles (IRR = 0.98, CI = [0.89,1.08]) lead to significant changes in the value of the dependent variable: we find positive effects for lagged OwnSingles (IRR = 1.32, CI = [1.24, 1.40]), which suggests that majors tend to replicate their previous launch decisions; for demand through a weighted score (Demand) (IRR = 1.01, CI = [1.01, 1.01]), which indicates that majors tend to target subspaces where consumer preferences are concentrated; and for IndieSingles (IRR = 1.06, CI = [1.04, 1.08]), which suggests that greater activity by independent record companies prompts majors to release products of their own

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Summary

Introduction

Product proliferation is the strategy whereby a firm extends its product offer in a market or submarket so as to saturate the product space and minimize unmet demand (Mainkar, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2006). In the wake of these reports, Brander and Eaton (1984), Judd (1985), and Wernerfelt (1986) delivered formal proofs that, when a market has the traits of a differentiated-product oligopoly, firms' sequential decisions about the attributes of products to be offered on the market can lead to subgame perfect equilibria where each competitor monopolizes a submarket via product proliferation This is because firms tend to grow reliant on different pockets of demand and strive to minimize local competitive intensity: filling a region of the product space (i.e., a subspace) with own products helps toward this purpose by making it less profitable for rivals to introduce similar products (Barroso, Giarratana, Reis, & Sorenson, 2016) and conveying the threat of retaliation against those who invade the proliferator's “turf.”

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