Abstract
This research uses data of Chinese listed companies during 2009-2012 to test the effects of product market competition on the incentives to engage in earnings manipulation in companies with different ownership type. Results show that competitive market has no impact on earnings management in state-owned companies, while nonstate-owned companies in more competitive markets have less incentive to engage in earnings manipulation. Results also show that all kinds of companies with higher status in product market tend to incur higher level of earnings management. Moreover, for non-state-owned companies, concentrated ownership structure weakens the effect of product market competition but strengthen the effect of market status on earnings management. Keywords-Competition; Ownership Differences; Stateowned; Non-state-owned; Earnings Management
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