Procreative Ethics and the Problem of Evil

Abstract

Many people see the evil and suffering in our world as important if not decisive evidence against the claim that a loving God created our world and yet these same people typically see no real moral problem with human procreation. This chapter argues that these attitudes are in tension. More accurately, although it might turn out that the facts of evil and suffering threaten theism without also threatening human procreation, it would take philosophical work to show that this is the case. In the meantime we are left with two basic options, at least those of us who take the problem of evil seriously. First, we can grant the tension and revise our beliefs about the severity of the problem of evil in order to make procreation more justifiable. Second, we can grant the tension and acknowledge that human procreation raises important ethical problems. I will explore the latter option and argue that it should motivate us to develop a systematic justification of procreation. But even if my particular recommendation is not widely endorsed, I hope it becomes clear that thinking about procreative ethics and the problem of evil in tandem is fruitful because it unveils important connections between the two areas and reveals new challenges for each side. At the most general level, then, this chapter seeks to start a conversation about the often-neglected relationship between ethics and philosophy of religion.