Abstract

To reduce ambiguity across a conversation, interlocutors reach temporary conventions or referential precedents on how to refer to an entity. Despite their central role in communication, the cognitive underpinnings of the interpretation of precedents remain unclear, specifically the role and mechanisms by which information related to the speaker is integrated. We contrast predictions of one-stage, original two-stage, and extended two-stage models for the processing of speaker information and provide evidence favoring the latter: we show that both stages are sensitive to speaker-specific information. Using an experimental paradigm based on visual-world eye tracking in the context of a referential communication task, we look at the moment-by-moment interpretation of precedents and focus on the temporal profile of the influence of the speaker and linguistic information when facing ambiguity. We find two clearly identifiable moments where speaker-specific information has its effects on reference resolution. We conclude that these two stages reflect two distinct cognitive mechanisms, with different timings, and rely on different representational formats for encoding and accessing information about the speaker: a cue-driven memory retrieval process that mediates language processing and an inferential mechanism based on perspective-taking abilities.

Highlights

  • Definite repeated reference is a ubiquitous phenomenon during a conversation

  • Despite the central role that this phenomenon plays in communication and the considerable amount of Processing Speaker-Specific Information research done to explain it, the cognitive underpinnings of the interpretation of precedents remain a matter of debate, concerning the mechanisms by which information related to the speaker is integrated

  • Evidence for this can be found in the relation between the object that participants selected in the main task and the guessing game

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Summary

Introduction

Definite repeated reference is a ubiquitous phenomenon during a conversation. Interlocutors talk about uniquely identifiable entities that are referred to multiple times using the same or a similar expression, such as “the black guitar,” “my classmate,” or “your boss.” Because each entity can be referred to in multiple ways (e.g., “the old guitar,” “she,” or “Mrs Smith”), and the same expression can be used to refer to different things (there are many black guitars, as well as classmates and people whose last name is Smith), interlocutors reach temporary conventions on how to refer to each entity. Because each entity can be referred to in multiple ways (e.g., “the old guitar,” “she,” or “Mrs Smith”), and the same expression can be used to refer to different things (there are many black guitars, as well as classmates and people whose last name is Smith), interlocutors reach temporary conventions on how to refer to each entity. These conventions or referential precedents help in reducing ambiguity (Clark and WilkesGibbs, 1986; Brennan and Clark, 1996). Despite the central role that this phenomenon plays in communication and the considerable amount of Processing Speaker-Specific Information research done to explain it, the cognitive underpinnings of the interpretation of precedents remain a matter of debate, concerning the mechanisms by which information related to the speaker is integrated

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