Abstract
With the globalization of the manufacturing supply chain, the malicious modification existing in the middle of distrust is becoming an important security issue on the chip. These modifications are called hardware Trojan (HT). HT is difficult to detect due to its high concealment and diversity of implementation. HT detection based on the side channel is a relatively effective detection method because it does not need to trigger the Trojan or destroy the chip. However, detection based on the side channel faces two major challenges. Firstly, the side channel detection is quite dependent on the golden model. The second one relates to the accuracy of the samples. Side channel information of the chip comes from the hardware manufacturing process and implementation, so it is obviously affected by process variation. In the existing work, many self-reference detection methods have been proposed to solve the problem of missing golden models. However, the existing methods often have special requirements for the circuit structure (such as the need for self-similar structures in the circuit). And, they can hardly resist process variation. This paper combines design and detection. We select the power consumption generated at different times and construct two self-reference ‘knapsack’ to detect HT. The solution proposed in this article is a kind of self-reference method, but we need neither self-similar structures nor the same state of some clocks in the circuit. Meanwhile, by constructing the ‘knapsack,’ we reduce the impact of process variation on detection accuracy because the process variation in the two sets of power consumption is balanced.
Highlights
With the development of global outsourcing manufacturing services, an emerging security problem has emerged in the field of Integrated Circuit (IC) manufacturing, that is, potential chip modification in uncontrolled chip manufacturing [1]. ese modifications, maliciously and intentionally applied to the circuit, are called the Hardware Trojans [2]. e hardware Trojan can be divided into the Always-On Hardware Trojans (AHT) and the Triggered Hardware Trojans (THT) according to the different trigger mode
A Triggered Hardware Trojan contains two parts: the trigger circuit and payload circuit, as shown in Figure 1. e trigger circuit starts running after the power is on, but it does not show malicious behaviour
If the same toggle count (TC) occurs for any input, the trigger circuit loses its function. erefore, the adversary cannot bypass our detection through the second method
Summary
With the development of global outsourcing manufacturing services, an emerging security problem has emerged in the field of Integrated Circuit (IC) manufacturing, that is, potential chip modification in uncontrolled chip manufacturing [1]. ese modifications, maliciously and intentionally applied to the circuit, are called the Hardware Trojans [2]. e hardware Trojan can be divided into the Always-On Hardware Trojans (AHT) and the Triggered Hardware Trojans (THT) according to the different trigger mode. E trigger circuit starts running after the power is on, but it does not show malicious behaviour. It only monitors some signals or a series of events in the circuit, and its output is connected to the load circuit of the Trojan. E payload circuit is usually in a silent state It is possible to inject hardware trojans in design, fabrication, and assembly [3]
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