Abstract
Attempts to circumvent presidential term limits in African countries show a puzzling variation of success or failure. This variation is due to both international and domestic factors. However, how these interact is not yet well understood. This article analyses how international donors and organisations intervened in the attempted term limit circumvention in Malawi from 1999 to 2003. It differentiates between different types of instruments used by donors in democracy promotion, and, by doing so, contributes to the question whether donors in term limit struggles can contribute to genuine democratic consolidation. It employs deductive process-tracing based on an analysis of primary media sources and interviews conducted during field research. The results show that erosion of party support as a proximate and a strong civil society response as a mediate factor were important in saving Malawi’s term limit. Aid conditionality and democracy promotion by donors and international organisations exerted influence on both factors.
Highlights
Term limits are of special interest in the study of African politics
Statements of former United Democratic Front (UDF) MPs, who feared that the passing of the Third Term Bill would halt aid and declared their opposition (Integrated Regional Information Network [IRIN], 2002d), provide another strong indication that aid conditionality played a role especially in the final phase of Muluzi’s third term attempt
It is difficult to assess exactly what role democracy promotion based on linkage and the logic of appropriateness played, like public statements and civil society support through democracy assistance, there is evidence that it was important besides donor leverage
Summary
Term limits are of special interest in the study of African politics. African countries have introduced term limits into their constitutions increasingly since the early 1990s (McKie, 2017). There is not much indication that donor conditionality already played an important role in the political calculus of the MPs. During the session in which Parliament discussed and voted on the Open Term Bill, only one speaker warned: “Yes, let us be constructive in our positions. Statements of former UDF MPs, who feared that the passing of the Third Term Bill would halt aid and declared their opposition (Integrated Regional Information Network [IRIN], 2002d), provide another strong indication that aid conditionality played a role especially in the final phase of Muluzi’s third term attempt. Muluzi responded to the increased pressure by lashing out towards donors and domestic civil society during rallies of his country tour for grassroots support (Mwase, 2002) In one instance, he stated that “donors should keep their money if they want to cause chaos and commotion by funding demonstrations” (Agence France Presse, 2002d). The internal rifts within the UDF as well as between the UDF and opposition parties remained until January, so that no majority on the Third Term Bill could be gained
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