Process theism and physical evil

Abstract

Process theism has been in the limelight in the past few decades for its controversial and refreshing conception of God. One aspect of process theism that has received increasing attention is process theodicy, but the discussion tends to centre around the problem of moral evil evil perpetrated by human agents. This preoccupation with the problem of moral evil leads to the neglect of the problem of physical evil by many process philosophers. However, in regard to this problem, it must be said that none of the process philosophers had devoted more attention to it than Charles Hartshorne. My intention here is to review Hartshome's strategy for a process solution of physical evil with the aim of revealing its fundamental weakness. Hartshorne's process theism is committed to the notion of God as the cosmic organism, which postulates that the world is an integral part of God's being, characterized as the body of God. 1 It can be supposedly argued that if the world is God's body and if having a body is an essential feature of the divine reality, then it must be the case that the divine reality, so far as this present reality is concerned, is constituted by some degree of conflict, disorder and evil. If there is evil in this world, would not God be tainted by it, since the world is an integral part of his being? To many, it would appear obvious enough that the notion of a God who literally excludes the world as an integral part of his being, as in classical theism, would have more than enough to handle in the reality of evil within that allegedly more advantageous theistic framework. What can be more intractable than the problem that seems to arise when the reality of evil has to be considered as a part of God's reality as well?