Abstract
ABSTRACTWe evaluate two reforms that modified the procedures of recruitment and promotion in Italian academia to balance the preeminent role of the recruiting school and to counter nepotism. We theoretically derive the decision rule of the evaluation committees and test it against data including information from all selections to associate and full professorship that were initiated by the Italian schools of economics between 2004 and 2011. Empirical results suggest that both reforms fell short of their goals.
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