Procedural Justice in Juvenile Courts Law on the Books and Law in Action

Abstract

Abstract Procedure and substance intertwine inextricably in juvenile courts. Progressives envisioned an informal court that made decisions in the child’s “best interests.” The Supreme Court in Gault emphasized the disjunctions between rehabilitative rhetoric and punitive reality and required greater procedural safeguards in juvenile courts (In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 [1967]). Although Gault provided impetus for the procedural convergence between juvenile and criminal courts, a substantial gulf remains between theory and reality, between the “law on the books” and the “law in action.” Theoretically, the Constitution and state laws entitle delinquents to formal trials and assistance of counsel. In reality, juvenile courts try youths using procedures to which few adults would consent. More than three decades ago, the Supreme Court in Kent v. United States observed that “the child receives the worst of both worlds: he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children” (383 U.S. 541,556 [1966], emphasis added). In the “worst of both worlds” of contemporary juvenile justice youths continue to receive neither therapy nor justice, but instead experience punishment without the criminal procedural safeguards provided to adults.