Problems with the Wright Route to Skepticism

Abstract

Crispin Wright (1991) presents what he takes to be the strongest Cartesian skeptical argument and then offers a subtle and complex analysis of the argument's weaknesses. His strategy for imploding the Cartesian demon involves an intricate and extended comparison between his reconstructed Cartesian skeptical argument from dreaming and a parallel argument concerning knowledge based on intellection. I will not consider this comparison here. Instead, I will begin by raising some questions about Wright's use of some epistemic notions in his reconstruction of the skeptical argument from dreaming. In particular, I will focus upon his choice of the notion of warrant, as opposed to reasonable, or justified belief, as the object of skeptical attention. I will argue that Wright fails to establish, or even make plausible, his crucial skeptical premise that I lack warrantfor believing that I am not dreaming. Until this premise has been successfully supported, there is no need for Wright to embark upon the complex criticism of the argument from dreaming in which he considers skepticism about intellection.I To set the stage, let us note that Wright is critical of expositors of skepticism who see skeptical arguments as aimed at somehow directly establishing that one lacks knowledge, while remaining silent about weaker epistemic notions. The problem with such an interpretation of skepticism, says Wright, is that the antiskeptic can make a simple Russellian retreat in the face of the skeptic's direct attack on knowledge, conceding the absence of knowledge while maintaining that, for all the skeptic has shown, one is fully justified in believing all the propositions one cherishes. On the other hand, Wright is leery of those who see skeptical argu-