PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING THE SYSTEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL IN THE CONSTITUENT ENTITIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AFTER THE 2020 CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Abstract

This article analyzes the prerequisites for the 2020 constitutional reform, which abolished the institution of constitutional and statutory courts in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. The author identifies the significance and factors for the development of regional constitutional justice, considered as one of the fundamental elements of Russian constitutional federalism. The study provides a detailed analysis of the arguments for liquidating the bodies of constitutional justice of the RF constituent entities with no options for ensuring effective constitutional control at the regional level, which seems to be a reflection of society’s low interest in maintaining the constitutional order. The leading reason for liquidating regional constitutional and statutory courts is the lack of a political request for their activities due to the underdevelopment of Russian federalism. The novelty of this research lies in identifying the relationship between the development of constitutional justice in the RF constituent entities and the political stability of the Russian state’s constitutional system. The author emphasizes the importance of the possibility of establishing constitutional justice bodies in the RF constituent entities for the development of domestic constitutionalism, which is preserved based on the current constitutional legislation. At the same time, the model, proposed within the 2020 constitutional reform and subjugating the regional constitutional justice to the RF subjects’ representative bodies, violates the constitutional principle of the judiciary’s independence. This article propose a hypothesis that the development of the constitutional basis of Russian federalism relies on the stability of the constitutional and statutory legislation of the regions. Consequently, the effectiveness of regional constitutional control is the foundation of the existing constitutional order. Therefore, the institutions exercising such control should be removed from the direct subordination to the representative bodies of the federation’s subjects.