Problems of Consciousness in Nineteenth Century British and American Neurology

Abstract

This chapter focuses on analyses of consciousness by nineteenth century British and American neurologists. Consciousness was at the forefront of their inquiry because of its perceived role in voluntary activities, because of criteria for identification of such activities, and because of its central role in neurophysiological functions of the brain. This paper identifies three main enigmas. One is whether consciousness is necessary during activities such as reflexes and instincts. A second is about whether the interpretation of functional brain centers should be in terms of a Cartesian-like unity or as multiple and interacting processes. The third deals with whether the relationship between the mind and the brain is dualistic or monistic. Questions about consciousness as discussed by nineteenth century neurologists differ from those discussed by Chalmers in the late twentieth century. They were neither characterized as solvable-unsolvable, easy-hard, or solved-unsolved nor did they include a quest understand the experience of consciousness in the sense of Chalmers’ “hard problem.”