Problematiek rond de britse Betalingsbalans

Abstract

An analysis of developments prior to the devaluation of sterling in November 1967 suggests that a fundamental disequilibrium became unambiguously clear only relatively shortly before the parity actually was adjusted. The devaluation provided scope for an improvement in the balance of payments of something like $2,5 billion. A very restrictive fiscal programme was to be the main instrument to help achieve this result. The long interval between devaluation and this policy to become fully effective, combined with the failure to back it up with an adequate monetary policy seem to be the principal factors behind the disappointing performance of the U.K. balance of payments during more than a year after the devaluation. Early in 1969 fiscal policy had reached its full impact and significantly more emphasis was placed on monetary policy. Although these factors will, belatedly, contribute to the achievement of a balance of payments surplus, it is doubtful whether the original goal — a sustained surplus of at least $ 1,2 billion a year — can still be attained. In that case a long-run solution to the problem of Britain's massive short-run debts appears to be no more than the recognition of an unpleasant reality.