Problematic Ontological Underpinnings of Positive Psychology

Abstract

In this article, we contend that many of the problems delineated in this special issue on positive psychology stem from an unexamined philosophical premise—its ontology. The world of `ontology' is vast and somewhat ill defined, but here we mean simply assumptions of what is ultimately real and fundamental, especially regarding the self. We first clarify and compare two major ontologies of the self, one that we argue underlies and spawns problems for positive psychology and one that we will describe as a promising alternative for the project of positive psychology. We focus on three important features of this project: (1) commitment to an ideal of the `disinterested observer'; (2) emotional satisfaction as a key conception; and (3) the tendency to view human phenomena as decontextualized from culture, history, and even physical situations. These features will display both how one set of ontological premises has underlain mainstream positive psychology and how the alternative offers a fresh perspective that addresses many issues within the field.