Abstract

People give subadditive probability judgments--in violation of probability theory--when asked to assess each in a set of 3 or more mutually exclusive hypotheses, as indicated by their sum exceeding 1. Three potential evidential influences on subadditivity--cue conflict, cue frequency, and cue redundancy--are distinguished and tested in 5 experiments using a classification-learning task. Results indicate that (a) judgments of probability and of frequency are systematically subadditive even when the judgments are based on cues learned within the experimental context, (b) cue conflict has a reliable influence on the degree of subadditivity, and (c) judgments in this context are well described by a linear-discounting model within the framework of support theory.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.