Abstract
Hartry Field has recently suggested that a non-standard probability calculus better represents our beliefs about vague matters. His theory has two notable features: (i) that your attitude to P when you are certain that P is higher-order borderline ought to be the same as your attitude when you are certain that P is simply borderline, and (ii) that when you are certain that P is borderline you should have no credence in P and no credence in ~. This chapter rejects both elements of this view and advocates instead for the view that when you are in possession of all the possible evidence, and it is borderline whether P is borderline, it is borderline whether you should believe P. Secondly, it argues for probabilism: the view that your credences ought to conform to the probability calculus. To get a handle on these issues, the chapter looks at Dutch book arguments and comparative axiomatizations of probability theory.
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