Abstract
Democratic regimes need leaders with high intrinsic motivation to serve their constituents. In this paper, we investigate the levels of leaders’ pro-social motivation, how such levels differ from those of villagers, whether they are affected when the leaders are elected, and the persistence over several years. A regression discontinuity design based on close elections combined with a panel of incentivized lab-in-the-field measures of solidarity reveals that being elected and holding office as a local leader results in making more pro-social choices two and six years after the election. An additional experiment measuring normative expectations towards leaders suggests that leaders' higher pro-sociality may come from internalizing these expectations. We also discuss the role of income, collective action and network ties and how the increase in pro-sociality relates to local level corruption.
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