Pro-Poor Decentralization in Ghana: Exploring the Facilitators and the Limitations

Abstract

While significant research exists on why decentralization should result in poverty reduction, how this actually happens and the limitations have received little empirical research attention. Such empirical evidence is important due to the widespread adoption of decentralization in many developing and transition countries, and the consequent expectation that decentralization should be pro-poor. With empirical evidence from ten selected districts in Ghana, this article provides fresh insights into the facilitators and the limitations of pro-poor decentralization. The evidence suggests that although decentralization holds many prospects for poverty reduction, there are major limitations on how this can happen. The article establishes that while participation and representation, transparency, and accountability remain important facilitating factors, the capacity of district assemblies, apathy of citizens, resource constraints, political interference, and the absence of collaborating nonstate actors, among other factors, have limited the effectiveness of decentralization in reducing poverty in Ghana. The overarching limitation is that decentralization, which is often designed largely with political goals, is expected to be pro-poor, perhaps, only as an afterthought.