Pro-government militias and civil war termination

Previous research on non-state actors involved in civil wars has tended to disregard the role of extra-dyad agents in influencing conflict outcomes. Little is known as to whether the presence of such extra-dyadic actors as pro-regime militias affects conflict termination and outcomes. This article develops and tests a number of hypotheses on the pro-government militias’ effect upon civil war outcomes. It proposes that pro-regime militias involved in intrastate conflicts tend to act as proponents of ‘no peace, no war’, favouring low-activity violence and ceasefires over other conflict outcomes. These hypotheses are examined using an expanded dataset on pro-government militias and armed conflict in a statistical analysis of 229 civil war episodes from 1991 to 2015. These findings shed new light on the role of extra-state actors in civil wars.

Does the military strength of rebel movements affect conflict-related sexual violence by pro-government militias (PGMs)? Existing studies on PGMs show the significant role that PGMs can have in shaping conflict dynamics and outcomes. What remains understudied is how the variation in power capabilities between conflict actors and the sources of support for PGMs influences civilian victimization by militia groups. We argue that strong rebels tip the balance of power against the state, making the state more susceptible to authorizing or allowing sexual violence by PGMs. In addition, the level of autonomy of PGMs from the government is likely to influence their sexual violence, conditional on rebel strength. When rebels are militarily strong, states are likely to order or tolerate sexual violence by PGMs that they train and/or provide resources to, thereby resulting in sexual violence by state-dependent PGMs. Examining all civil conflicts from 1989 to 2009 and using newly collected data on state-dependence of PGMs, our empirical findings provide evidence that PGMs are associated with higher levels of conflict-related sexual violence when the government faces strong rebels. Results also show that the likelihood of sexual violence by state-dependent PGMs increases when rebels exhibit strong military capabilities.

It has long been understood that pro-government militia activity and pro-government militia violence increase during civil war. Recent literature contends that pro-government militia activity also rises when a state is involved in an interstate rivalry. We maintain that the combination of these two threats may, somewhat counterintuitively, result in reduced pro-government militia activity in some autocracies. This unexpected outcome can be explained by differences in state capacity and legitimacy. Using Geddes’ categorization of authoritarian regimes, we expect a decline in the number of operational pro-government militias when personalist and military regimes are challenged by both an insurgency and a rivalry. Pro-government militia liabilities are magnified in this context and add to these governments’ already considerable cumulative hazards. Pro-government militia numbers will, in contrast, remain consistent in single party regimes in this same circumstance. Since party governments have ample capacity, well-known disadvantages of pro-government militias rarely pose a threat to these capable regimes. In a sample of 142 autocracies from 1981 to 2010, we find considerable empirical support for our contention.

In recent years, the relations between weak central governments and armed groups in the periphery have attracted great attention. Rebels, warlords and other actors have not only undermined the authorities' grip on power, but gradually come to shape the nature of governance and political system in their countries. Warlordism, rebelocracies and aliocracies are just a few of the political systems identified by students of conflict and armed groups. However, the literature has generally overlooked one category of armed groups and their implications on political order: pro-government militias (PGMs). As PGMs have become ubiquitous in civil wars, this article identifies a new political order emerging in countries where central governments have become reliant on PGMs in counter-insurgency operations. The article defines this order as a militiatocracy. Unlike armed groups in other political orders, PGMs do not seek to overthrow, undermine or replace the central government. Instead, in militiatocracies, PGMs and central governments develop symbiotic relations, which on the one hand help the government to survive an insurgency, but on the other allow militia leaders to secure an increasing presence in politics. The article illustrates the emergence and nature of militiatocracies by employing the case of Syria during the civil war.

Governments often supplement the regular military with paramilitaries and progovernment militias (PGMs). However, it is unclear what determines states’ selection of these auxiliary forces, and our understanding of how auxiliary force structures develop remains limited. The crucial difference between the two auxiliary types is their embeddedness in official structures. Paramilitaries are organized under the government to support/replace the regular military, whereas PGMs exist outside the state apparatus. Within a principal–agent framework, we argue that a state’s investment in a particular auxiliary force structure is shaped by available resources and capacity, accountability/deniability, and domestic threats. Our results based on quantitative analysis from 1981 to 2007 find that (a) state capacity is crucial for sustaining paramilitaries, but not PGMs; (b) PGMs, unlike paramilitaries, are more common in states involved in civil conflict; and (c) although both paramilitaries and PGMs are associated with regime instability, there is no significant difference between them in that context.

It is typically argued that civil war acutely inhibits inward flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). However, the evidence is inconsistent and does not support the assumed negative relationship between civil war and FDI. Some studies suggest that FDI enters countries with internal armed conflicts unabated; others show that civil war economies exhibit strong increases in FDI during conflict. Underpinned by a liberal interpretation of war, this scholarship finds these trends to be surprising, counter-intuitive and curious, arguing that FDI enters conflict zones in spite of violence. In contrast, critical perspectives can provide insights by acknowledging that violence can facilitate economic processes such as FDI, creating a particular form of security and stability that can be conducive to FDI inflows. This article examines the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), a country which exhibited strong increases in FDI during phases of the conflict. It is argued that particular types of violence perpetrated by the government’s armed forces and pro-government militias – groups which were sympathetic to the interests of key investors in the oil industry – facilitated FDI in Sudan’s oil sector during the 2000s to the detriment of large sections of the civilian population affected by the violence.

Abstract: Conflicts in Africa have brought the fragmentation of the monopoly of violence to the fore. In conflicts such as those that occurred in Sudan and Sierra Leone, militias play a significant role in the state’s strategy against the rebels. In the literature on civil wars, little attention is paid to groups fighting alongside the state and their effects on conflict outcomes. While all militias share the ability to use organized violence, some of them can also be a source of security for local communities. However, the relationship between states and pro-government militias can affect the stability of the state. This study focuses on militia groups acting alongside the state and examines the extent to which the dynamics of collaboration between the states and militias affect state fragmentation.

Examining militia relationships with the government and civilian populations can help scholars and policymakers better assess differences in militia form, function, and behavior. In this article, we examine the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU), a pro-government militia in the Philippines, to better understand how militia participants view insurgents, politicians, state security forces, and civilians based on their experiences serving in the group. We argue that analyzing these beliefs is critical to understanding how militias influence civilian security and the risk of political violence in conflict-contested areas, as well as the trajectory of civil conflict in states like the Philippines that rely on militias to perform core security functions. We base the analysis on surveys and interviews with CAFGU members and civilians living in the Eastern Visayas, a region of active and ongoing conflict, where insurgents and other armed militants advance their aims through acts of violence and terrorism. In doing so, we contribute to a growing literature on the role that militias play in civil war, as well as the implications that follow when states choose to arm “civilians” to aid in counterinsurgency and conflict suppression.

This article introduces the global Pro-Government Militias Database (PGMD). Despite the devastating record of some pro-government groups, there has been little research on why these forces form, under what conditions they are most likely to act, and how they affect the risk of internal conflict, repression, and state fragility. From events in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria and the countries of the Arab Spring we know that pro-government militias operate in a variety of contexts. They are often linked with extreme violence and disregard for the laws of war. Yet research, notably quantitative research, lags behind events. In this article we give an overview of the PGMD, a new global dataset that identifies pro-government militias from 1981 to 2007. The information on pro-government militias (PGMs) is presented in a relational data structure, which allows researchers to browse and download different versions of the dataset and access over 3,500 sources that informed the coding. The database shows the wide proliferation and diffusion of these groups. We identify 332 PGMs and specify how they are linked to government, for example via the governing political party, individual leaders, or the military. The dataset captures the type of affiliation of the groups to the government by distinguishing between informal and semi-official militias. It identifies, among others, membership characteristics and the types of groups they target. These data are likely to be relevant to research on state strength and state failure, the dynamics of conflict, including security sector reform, demobilization and reintegration, as well as work on human rights and the interactions between different state and non-state actors. To illustrate uses of the data, we include the PGM data in a standard model of armed conflict and find that such groups increase the risk of civil war.

Chapter 1: Introduction Theme of the Book The Basics of Civil War Civil War Onset The Duration of Civil Wars Outcome and Termination of Civil Wars Civil War Recurrence Civil War Patterns Conclusion Suggested Reading Chapter 2: Costs of Civil War Casualties Displacement Economic Costs Crime and Violence Education Environment Conflict Management Implications Conclusion Suggested Reading Chapter 3: Civil War Dynamics Civil War Types and Trends Civil War Tactics Conflict Management Implications Conclusion Suggested Reading Chapter 4: What Causes Civil War? Approaches to Civil War Onset Ethno-Religious Civil War Conflict Management Implications Conclusion Suggested Reading Chapter 5: Natural Resources and Civil War Natural Resources and the Resource Curse Resources and Conflict Oil, Diamonds, Illicit Drugs, and Timber Conclusion Suggested Reading Chapter 6: The Termination of Civil War and Post-Conflict Issues Types and Trends in Civil War Outcomes Types of Peace Agreements Post-Conflict Issues Implications for Conflict Management Conclusion Suggested Reading Chapter 7: International Intervention Types of International Interventions Mediation Peace Agreements and Military Provisions Peacebuilding Humanitarian Law Implications for Conflict Management Conclusion Suggested Reading Chapter 8: Terrorism and Civil War What is Terrorism? Incidence of Terrorism Tactics, Targets, and Means Terrorism During Civil War Causes of Terrorism Characteristics and Structure of Terrorist Groups Islam, Civil War, and Terrorism Conflict Termination and Terrorist Spoilers Case Studies Implications for Conflict Management Conclusion Suggested Reading Chapter 9: Conclusion Civil War Costs and Trends Overview of Conclusions and Policy Implications Final Word

Although the existing literature on Pro-Government Militias (PGMs) is rife with studies on various aspects of government-militia relations, not much is known about specific approaches that governments employ to ensure loyalty of their semi-formal proxies. Lessons from recent civil war in Sudan and other cases of PGMs turning their arms against their former patrons further enhance the importance of understanding which mechanisms (if any) incumbents deploy to prevent militias from “going rogue.” In this study, we examine three mechanisms employed by governments to guarantee loyalty of their militia allies. We emphasize the importance of personal, sectarian and other ideological fractionalization within rebel groups; deployment of extreme violence by PGMs against co-ethnic civilians; and formation of rival militias as the most effective PGM loyalty assurance tools available to the incumbents. We test these theoretical assumptions on the case study of the Second Chechen War to elucidate how each of these mechanisms was implemented in practice during the decades-long counterinsurgency campaign waged by Moscow.

ABSTRACTThe research to date on pro-governm`ent militias demonstrates that numerous pro-regime militia groups were actively deployed in civil wars over the last half a century. As hundreds of militia groups emerged amid civil warfare, hundreds more were disbanded, integrated into regular military, or transformed into political forces. This study seeks to improve our understanding of global patterns of militia demobilization. In contrast to the growing body of literature that explores the emergence of militias or examines their relationship with the state, studies on the demise of pro-government militias are notable by their absence. Statistical analysis of 220 pro-government militias involved in seventy-five civil wars from 1981 to 2011, based on a recent database of pro-government militias, demonstrates that the disappearance of militias has little to do with the termination of armed conflict. This study is the first to investigate when and under which conditions militias created to assist governments in fighting civil wars disband.

Given the appalling consequences of civil wars, why are the competing actors within a state unable to come to a settlement to avoid the costs of conflict? How might external parties affect the likelihood that a civil war begins? How do their actions affect the duration and outcome of civil conflicts that are already underway? This project draws on three main approaches—bargaining theory, signaling theory, and rational expectations—to examine how external actors might affect the onset, duration and outcome of civil wars. Signals from external actors are important because they represent a potential increase (or decrease) in fighting capabilities for the government or the opposition if a war were to begin. Costly signals should not affect the probability of civil war onset because they are readily observable ex ante, which allows the government and opposition to peacefully adjust their bargaining positions based on changes in relative capabilities. In contrast, cheap hostile signals make civil war more likely by increasing the risk that an opposition group overestimates its ability to stage a successful rebellion with external support. Cheap supportive signals work in the opposite manner because they represent increased fighting capabilities for the government. Furthermore, signals sent in the pre-war period have important implications for the duration and outcome of civil conflicts because competing intrastate actors develop expectations for future interventions prior to deciding to fight. Expected interventions should have little consequence for the duration and outcome of the conflict because they are endogenous to the pre-war bargaining positions. In contrast, unexpected

In nearly two-thirds of civil wars since 1989, governments have received support in their counterinsurgency operations from militias. Many scholars predict higher levels of violence in conflicts involving pro-government militias because governments are either unable or unwilling to control militias. This article challenges this view, arguing that governments can and do often control militia behavior in civil war. Governments make strategic decisions about whether to use violence against civilians, encouraging both regular military forces and militia forces to target civilians or restraining regular military forces and militia forces from attacking civilians. In some cases, however, government and militia behavior differs. When a militia recruits its members from the same constituency as the insurgents, the militia is less likely to target civilians, as doing so would mean attacking their own community. Statistical analyses, using new data on pro-government militia violence in civil wars from 1989 to 2010, support these arguments.

This article examines how civilian defense militias shape violence during civil war. We define civilian defense forces as a sedentary and defensive form of pro-government militia that incumbents often use to harness the participation of civilians during a counterinsurgency campaign. We argue that civilian defense forces reduce the problem of insurgent identification. This leads to a reduction in state violence against civilians. However, we also claim that these actors undermine civilian support for insurgents, which leads to an increase in rebel violence against civilians and overall intensification of conflict. A statistical analysis of government and rebel violence against civilians from 1981 to 2005 and a qualitative assessment of a civilian defense force operating in Iraq from 2005 to 2009 offer strong support for our theoretical claims. These findings provide further insight into pro-government militias and their effects on violence. They also have wider ethical implications for the use of civilian collaborators during civil war.