Abstract
ABSTRACT The paper argues that governing parties can use privatization as a political discipline mechanism to reward core constituents and swing voters by diverting unwanted social and economic costs to other places. This is tested by analysing the dispersal of asylum seekers across English local authorities before and after the Conservative Party-led privatization of the dispersal system in 2011. The findings suggest that asylum dispersals to Labour Party ‘core’ constituencies increased following privatization, but that dispersals to ‘swing’ districts were unchanged. Dispersals to places with high institutional capacity decreased, despite contractors being expected to settle asylum seekers in such areas.
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