Privatisation of the commons: the introduction of individual transferable quotas in developed fisheries

Abstract

The failure of existing systems to achieve a sustainable equilibrium between resources and fishing effort has led to a search for alternative approaches to the management of common property resources. Individual transferable quotas (ITQs), including the allocation of fixed shares of the potential harvest among licensed vessels which may be exchanged, leased or sold on an open market, have been introduced in a handful of developed countries. The paper examines evidence from New Zealand, Canada and Iceland for common tendencies and unresolved issues. Most of the benefits claimed for ITQs are economic: increased operating efficiency, rationalisation of fleet structure, improved asset management and reduced monitoring costs for central government. The literature does little to expose the underlying moral dilemmas and the concern for social equity and balanced regional development. The paper concludes that, while their efficacy has yet to be tested in complex developed fisheries and they are unlikely to usurp other regulatory mechanisms, ITQs may have an important role to play in the development of a sustainable management strategy.