Private security companies and the European borderscapes

Abstract

This chapter examines the implications of the increasing involvement of private security companies (PSCs) on the formulation and practices of European immigration and border control. The rise of private involvement in border control can be seen as a subset of the migration industry, alongside, and sometimes interacting with, other subsets like facilitating or rescue services relating to migratory movement (see Introduction). At the outset, it is argued that the European borders are not staticgeographic phenomena, but rather borderscapes-that is, dynamic and multifaceted sites of interventions for public and private actors. These interventions can be conceptualized as processes of borderscaping, whereby the political, epistemological and physical elements of borders are dissolved, redefined and re-territorialized. The notion of borderscape contracts is suggested as a way of highlighting the role played by PSCs in these processes. Some examples of PSC borderscape contracts are examined. These include the UK Border Agency’s outsourcing of border enforcement functions to G4S, Finmeccanica’s role in the construction of Libyan border control capacities and PSC involvement in the European external border surveillance system (EUROSUR) project’s numerous advanced borders projects. It is argued that PSC’s role in externalization1 and their development of new, advanced technologies securitizes and thus transforms the day-to-day governance of the European borders. This, in turn, leads to serious questions regarding the opaqueness of borderscape budgets, lock-in effects making it difficultfor public actors to reverse PSC militarization of borders and the humanitarian consequences of this for migrants. The chapter conceptualizes this development as cases of neoliber-alization2-that is, systemic shifts in the logic guiding public-private relations, which result in the inclusion of PSCs into the forums designing the European borderscapes.3 It is argued that PSC lobbyism through formal and informal forums reinforces a market dynamic where the industrial suppliers of border control technologies create a demand for their products in order to facilitate these systemic shifts. Some examples include the European Organization for Security (EOS), and the Frontex Agency’s Research and Development (R&D) Unit’s cooperation with PSCs on drones for border control. Moreover, several “blurred” public/private EU forums, like the European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB) and the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF), have been granted a large influence on the formulation of the European Union’s (EU) priorities on security research. One notable outcome, it is ventured, has been increased EU subsidies to PSC research into high-tech borderscapes exemplifying how PSCs are involved in the multileveled governance of the European borderscapes. The chapter suggests that the financial flows underpinning PSC bor-derscaping back to powerful financial actors, like the international banking sector, investment management firms and EU member states’ export credit agencies (ECAs). The activities of these actors, it is argued, show that the militarization of Europe’s borders is grounded not only in a desire to prevent immigration, but also in European politics of supporting military and control exports with public funds, even if this leads to increased debt in especially developing countries. The influence of PSCs and their financial supporters on the European border politics presents severe problems for the democratic transparency and humanitarian standards of European borderscapes.