Abstract
The provision of public goods plays a key role in the survival of leaders in democracies. Assuming that mass rail transport shares many of the characteristics of public goods, we claim that the public provision of railway services is more beneficial for political leaders in democracies than private provision. To estimate the effect of the type of provision of railway services on leader survival, we use new data on four European democracies that present variation in the public and private ownership of rail miles between 1913 and 1981. We find that the private provision of rail transport increases the hazard rates of leader deposition in these democracies. These results bear crucial implications, as they help to explain the sweeping policies of nationalization of public services that took place in the first half of the 20th Century in Western Europe.
Highlights
The regulation and provision of railroads are frequently addressed from an economic perspective to assess efficiency (e.g., Amaral, 2008; Bougna & Crozet, 2016; Waters, 2007)
Building upon previous theoretical work, we test whether the public provision of infrastructural goods like railways exerts a positive effect on political survival: due to its positive effect on an economy’s productivity (McGuire and Olson 1996) and a citizen’s level of consumption, it generates loyalty and political support of a large share of the population in exchange (Bueno De Mes quita et al 2003; Deacon, 2009)
We argue that the private provision of public goods should increase the hazard rates of leaders in large coalition systems because it reduces the general welfare of supporters, fueling their incentives to replace the incumbent with a challenger
Summary
The regulation and provision of railroads are frequently addressed from an economic perspective to assess efficiency (e.g., Amaral, 2008; Bougna & Crozet, 2016; Waters, 2007). In Selectorate Theory, the so-called ‘winning coalition’ (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003), whose loyalty is needed for political survival, is larger in democracies In this case, it is more effective to provide relatively more public goods such as infrastructure in exchange for political support (Deacon, 2009; Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003; Lake & Baum, 2001).. The public provision of railway transport allows democratic leaders to increase individual consumption and fulfill their mobility needs by providing more or improved access to rail services at lower fares. Subsidized railways such as the Belgian railways SNCB provide predominantly passenger services We test our hypothesis that the higher the share of private provision of rail transport, the higher the hazard rate of political leaders in democratic regimes
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
