Private prison labour: paradox or possibility? Evaluating modern-day systems and establishing a model framework through the lens of the Forced Labour Convention

Mario E Guido

doi:10.14324/111.2052-1871.119

Abstract

To download this paper please click https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10086914Overcrowding, deteriorating conditions, ever-increasing costs, recidivism. These are the terms that come to mind when thinking of the world’s punitive justice systems. Ostensibly, the international community has set out to combat these issues and it would be incorrect to say that measures in that direction have not been taken. Nonetheless, certain states have sought to remedy reoffending and favour reinsertion by increasing employment opportunities for prisoners and delegating the task to the private sector. In some common law jurisdictions, prisons have been entirely privatised (‘wholesale’ approach) whereas civil law jurisdictions tend to only privatise specific services while custodial functions remain with the State (‘semi-privee’ system). Regardless, given that France, Germany, and Australia have adopted these practices despite adoption of the Forced Labour Convention of the International Labour Organisation, which prima facie precludes private prison labour, it is thus necessary to analyse the reasons for these developments and to evaluate these systems. This article identifies the French system as the most compatible with the Convention and proposes a model framework that complies with the norm and serves the objectives of modern penal systems.

Highlights

Our continuous use of imprisonment as punishment has led us to a situation characterised by overcrowded prisons, unsustainable schemes, and unacceptable conditions in many penal systems around the globe
Regardless, given that France, Germany, and Australia have adopted these practices despite adoption of the Forced Labour Convention of the International Labour Organisation, which prima facie precludes private prison labour, it is necessary to analyse the reasons for these developments and to evaluate these systems
A contract compliance officer appointed by the state works on site and ensures that the contractual terms are complied with.[130]. Other states such as Victoria, which have opted for the ‘wholesale’ approach to prison privatisation, find themselves at odds with the Convention as the CEACR has observed that the norm ‘does not allow full delegation of supervision or control to a private business’

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Our continuous use of imprisonment as punishment has led us to a situation characterised by overcrowded prisons, unsustainable schemes, and unacceptable conditions in many penal systems around the globe. It seeks to ensure that rather than providing for private benefit, prison labour gives rise to a wider public benefit.[81] the CEACR has noted that, as prisoners do not enjoy the same rights as free workers, public authorities must exercise supervision and control in order to prevent private entities from determining the conditions of employment of ibid, Art. 2(2)(c). As will be explored, while the Convention prohibits forced labour for private profit or benefit, it does not preclude consensual prison labour for private profit or benefit.[94] e) Private profit or benefit The CEACR has observed that no condition precluding profit for private entities has ever been adduced.[95] At the same time, the Committee opines ‘the universal acceptance of the free-market principle might make obsolete legal requirements of a basic human rights Convention’.96. In my view, allowing private entities to derive profit from prison labour could exacerbate the risk of exploitation

Voluntariness

Findings

CONCLUSION