Abstract

This article is in two parts. The first part critically examines the foundations of Weinrib’s theory of corrective justice. It casts doubt upon his claim that private law faces incoherence if it is not entirely based upon corrective justice and questions the normative appeal of that view. The second part makes a variety of critical observations in relation to Weinrib’s corrective-justice-based treatment of particular areas of private law.

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