Abstract
We show that one third of SP specifically, by significant declines in R&D outlays, capital expenditures, and innovation activity of public firms. PE director appointments are also negatively related to acquisition activities and corporate venture capital investments of public firms, but positively related to the number of joint ventures and strategic alliances with other firms. Appointments of PE professionals as directors lead to higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, to improvement in operating performance, and create positive announcement abnormal returns.
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