Abstract

This study presents an integrated view of private corruption as an organizational issue. Two separate approaches are exploited aimed at understanding the factors that affect the agent's engagement in corruption and the features of the organizational dysfunctions, respectively. Costs and benefits on corruption are thus considered as affecting two organizational dimensions: (1) the intensity of corruption; and (2) the extent of corruption based on sub‐dimensions, when corruption results in damage or gains to the firm. Based on data from the Italian Court of Cassation judgements, the findings highlight the contextual and complex nature of corruption since: (1) both the causes and consequences of corruption are contingent upon the agent, firm and its environment; (2) costs do not have an overall explanatory power, while benefits better confirm the theoretical model; and (3) the extent and intensity of corruption show different, not necessarily correlated, levels of severity. Various anti‐corruption strategies are thus proposed.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.