PRIVATE CONSERVATION IN TURF‐MANAGED FISHERIES

Abstract

AbstractSpatial property rights in the ocean, such as territorial user right fisheries (TURFs), are increasingly used to overcome the tragedy of the commons. TURFs engender vastly different fishing incentives than in a common pool race; while this likely enhances conservation beyond an open access setting, conservation organizations may desire even greater protection. We argue that because TURFs are property rights, their implementation opens the door for “private conservation,” for example, where a conservation organization would purchase a set of TURFs to create an un‐fished marine reserve network. This possibility has interesting implications for biodiversity conservation, fishery management, and economic incentives, yet has received almost no attention in the literature. We examine this issue in a numerical spatial‐dynamic bioeconomic fishery model. Among other novel findings, we show: (i) Private acquisition of TURFs is likely to be a relatively inexpensive marine conservation strategy, particularly if the conservationist can capture some of the “conservation rents” that accrue due to spillover; (ii) Accounting for the strategic response of remaining fishermen can significantly reduce the cost of conservation; and (iii) The degree of fishing cooperation across TURFs plays a pivotal role in the costs of conservation; more‐cooperative TURF owners engage in more “free” conservation, dramatically reducing the overall costs of achieving a particular conservation target.