Privacy and Scalability Analysis of Vehicular Combinatorial Certificate Schemes

Abstract

Vehicular networks require secure communication, especially for safety applications. A public key infrastructure using a Combinatorial Certificate Scheme was implemented in the US Vehicle Infrastructure Integration (VII) Proof-of- Concept (PoC) trial to secure V2V communication and preserve vehicle privacy. This paper analyzes the privacy and scalability of the Combinatorial Certificate approach for a nationwide network of 200 million vehicles. It examines the tradeoffs between privacy, the ability to efficiently detect and remove bad actors, and the need to minimize the impact on innocent vehicles due to revocation and replacement of compromised shared certificates. Key findings include the level of vehicle anonymity that exists in situations of low vehicular density and the impact that certificate revocations have on innocent vehicles. A refinement to the Combinatorial Certificate Scheme is described that improves the innocent vehicle re-key quota lifetime by an order of magnitude.