Prior Margins of Victory and Legislative Careers: Competing Risks Regression Analysis in South Korean National Assembly, 1988–2015

Abstract

How do prior margins of victory influence the longevity and exit patterns of legislative careers in South Korea? Do marginal vote rates in the election determine when and how a legislator’s term ends? Although the relation ship between electoral security and legislative careers in US and Western parliamentary democracies is frequently studied, little is known about legislatures in new democracies. We analyze the effects of various electoral and institutional factors (especially vote margins of victory) on the duration and departure-type patterns of legislators in the South Korean National Assembly over the last 30 years (1988-2015). Our statistical findings show that higher vote margins in the previous election decrease the chance of electoral defeat in the next election. Legislators with narrow vote margins are positively associ ated with a higher likelihood of enforced removal from office by the courts during their tenures. Our finding provides an interesting link age between vote margins of victory and the abrupt discontinuity of legislative careers.