Principles-based standards and conditional accounting conservatism

Abstract

While the regulatory push towards principles-based standards in the United States and elsewhere is based on the notion that principles-based standards are more informative to capital market participants relative to rules-based standards, we do not know how principles-based standards impact accounting conservatism for U.S. firms. Using a measure of a firm's reliance on principles-based versus rules-based standards, we contribute to the literature by empirically examining the relation between conditional accounting conservatism and use of principles-based standards for U.S. firms. We find that conditional accounting conservatism is lower for firms relying more on principles-based standards, and this association is more pronounced for firms with greater earnings management incentives. However, the negative relation between conditional conservatism and use of principles-based standards is mitigated when there are contracting or litigation concerns. Additional analysis shows that reliance on principles-based standards also reduces unconditional accounting conservatism. Our findings are robust to using alternative measures of accounting conservatism, firm fixed effects, and a difference-in-difference model. Our evidence informs the FASB and the SEC that adoption of principles-based standards comes at a cost and has implications for regulators, auditors, analysts, investors, and others.