Abstract
ABSTRACT The EU conducts its external trade policy under close scrutiny by member-states. Yet, what about the role of regional authorities in federal states? To answer, we look at the principal-agent chain of delegation and explore to which extent regions with stakes and competencies in the matter exert control over EU policies. We distinguish three ideal-type roles regions can perform: principals in their own right, members of collective principals, and introduce the new concept of ‘transceivers’. A region can perform the role of principal with formal competencies, as does Flanders, which as one of multiple principals can withhold a Belgian decision. A region can also be one of a collective group of principals, as is the case for the region Hesse. Regions can finally perform the role of a ‘transceiver’ of information from policy-makers to constituencies (and vice versa), akin to the role of endorser, without formal framework for involvement – as does Scotland. Since regions and states alike depend on private sector information, two conclusions prevail. First, despite formal competencies, regions that are members of collective principals struggle becoming the sole interlocutor for the private sector. Second, despite lacking competencies, transceiver-regions are crucial interlocutors complementing member-state control over EU trade policy.
Highlights
The European Union conducts its external economic policies towards third countries under close scrutiny of its member-states
We argue that regions can be conceived of as either principals – when they have competencies over a policy field – or as ‘transceivers’ – when they find themselves in a position analogous to one of the domestic interest groups who, as outsiders, have to rely on pressure politics
We have explored the different roles regional actors can play in the monitoring of the European Commission as agent in European external trade negotiations
Summary
The European Union conducts its external economic policies towards third (non-EU) countries under close scrutiny of its member-states. The latter have delegated rulemaking powers to the EU-level, while on the other hand, they have opted to keep tight control over EU politics and policies (Delreux and Adriaensen 2017) This act of delegation from member states to the European Union has been studied in the Principal-Agent literature on the European Union (see for example Delreux and Adriaensen 2017). We check empirically whether regions perform the potential roles in our conceptualization (of principal or transceiver), arguing that their role influences their capacity to control the agent, i.e. the European Commission and sets different incentives for the private sector to engage with them We show how these ideal-typical roles play out in the cases of Flanders, Hesse, and Scotland. The framework holds the potential to fruitfully investigate how regional authorities try to represent their interests in EU decision-making on foreign trade and investment policy
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