Priming and personality predictors of social reasoning: Contrasting theory of mind, trust, HEXACO, and emotional intelligence

Abstract

Different theories of human reasoning produce alternative hypotheses about how personality and individual differences should relate to reasoning abilities. The present research documents a previously unclear significant relationship between theory of mind ability (measured via the mind in the eyes test) and conditional reasoning performance, which is differentially stronger for social rules rather than for descriptive, non-social contexts (Study 1, N = 316). A second study (N = 289) additionally documented associations between reasoning and both interpersonal trust (low reciprocation wariness) and Honesty-Humility. Secondarily, Study 2 also replicated a carryover effect for reasoning tasks, previously suggested as due to repetition priming. In Study 3 (N = 334), participants took a battery of trait measures that included the above significant predictors of social reasoning, additional measures of theory of mind ability, of interpersonal trust, and a measure of emotional intelligence. Reasoning again differed across contexts, documented priming/carryover effects between social/non-social reasoning tasks, and was significantly predicted by interpersonal trust and theory of mind. Differentially stronger correlations for social contents, relative to non-social contents, indicate some specificity in reasoning processes rather than entirely domain-specific reasoning.