Priming analogical reasoning with false memories.

Mark L Howe,Sarah R Garner,Linden J Ball,Emma Threadgold

doi:10.3758/s13421-015-0513-7

Mark L Howe, Sarah R Garner + Show 2 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-015-0513-7

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Abstract

Like true memories, false memories are capable of priming answers to insight-based problems. Recent research has attempted to extend this paradigm to more advanced problem-solving tasks, including those involving verbal analogical reasoning. However, these experiments are constrained inasmuch as problem solutions could be generated via spreading activation mechanisms (much like false memories themselves) rather than using complex reasoning processes. In three experiments we examined false memory priming of complex analogical reasoning tasks in the absence of simple semantic associations. In Experiment 1, we demonstrated the robustness of false memory priming in analogical reasoning when backward associative strength among the problem terms was eliminated. In Experiments 2a and 2b, we extended these findings by demonstrating priming on newly created homonym analogies that can only be solved by inhibiting semantic associations within the analogy. Overall, the findings of the present experiments provide evidence that the efficacy of false memory priming extends to complex analogical reasoning problems.

Highlights

IntroductionFalse memories are capable of priming answers to insight-based problems
Like true memories, false memories are capable of priming answers to insight-based problems
In Experiments 2a and 2b, we extended the priming of analogical reasoning based around an analytic mapping process by developing a new type of analogical reasoning task called a homonym analogy task

Summary

Introduction

False memories are capable of priming answers to insight-based problems. In the case of analogical reasoning, for example, there is a well-established body of evidence demonstrating that people are able to transfer directly their prior memories of problems and their solutions in order to assist them in tackling new, related problems (e.g., Bassok & Holyoak, 1989; Richland, Zur, & Holyoak, 2007; for a recent review, see Holyoak, 2012) Such analogical reasoning processes appear to rely largely on direct or explicit memory retrieval, there is evidence that prior memories can influence reasoning and problem solving through intuitive mechanisms that operate indirectly or implicitly. Kokinov (1990; Kokinov & Petrov, 2001), for example, has shown that implicit memory priming can facilitate performance with complex deductive, inductive, and analogical reasoning problems, benefitting both the strategy taken and the

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