Prime ministers’ identity in semi‐presidential regimes: Constitutional norms and cabinet formation outcomes

Abstract

Abstract. This article examines how presidential involvement in the cabinet formation process affects cabinet formation outcomes in the semi‐presidential regimes of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It analyzes whether the formal distribution of appointment‐dismissal powers allows for the development of useful indicators for predicting a prime minister's location on the continuum between the ideal points of the president and the legislature. First, to derive theoretical expectations about a prime minister's identity in the different types of semi‐presidential regimes, the article discusses constitutional variation in the formal distribution of cabinet appointment‐dismissal powers across semi‐presidential constitutions. Second, the empirical outcomes of cabinet formation are then compared with the theoretical predictions. Empirical tests, while providing substantial support for the hypothesized effect of variation in cabinet appointment‐dismissal powers, indicate the importance of other variables. Qualitative and quantitative differences in the character of the party system and the nature of the electoral cycle also have a systematic effect on cabinet formation outcomes.