Abstract

The cognitive implications of the phenomenon of dominance in nonhuman primates and other animals have been poorly addressed. This article shows that the concept of formal dominance currently used in the primatological literature is inherently dependent on the assumption that primates are capable of attribution of knowledge to other individuals. Although this assumption has never been made explicitly, without it the concept of formal dominance is virtually indistinguishable from other, more traditional views of dominance. Recent studies have failed to demonstrate attribution of knowledge in nonhuman primates, thus questioning the validity of formal dominance. The concept of formal dominance was originally proposed to account for a discrepancy between dominance hierarchies based on aggressive behavior and dominance hierarchies based on submissive signals. This article shows that such a discrepancy can be accounted for without invoking complex cognitive processes such as attribution of knowledge.

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