Pricing the serials library: in defence of a market economy

Abstract

In this paper it is argued that the origin of the unremitting price increases of academic journals is at the demand site of the serials market. Given that for each and every scientific article the publisher is monopolist, for which he may or may not charge the monopoly price, almost the only thing which can explain the upward trend in prices are changing elasticities of demand. It is suggested that the enormous increase of scientific publications in the aftermath of the institutionalisation of the publish or perish regime in combination with the library organisation at most universities precisely produces this result. Libraries are organised as a common pool and the real consumer hardly faces any budget constraint. When offering contracts for digital access, the publishers' strategy seems to be bundling and first degree price discrimination. Prices of the bundles will be determined in negotiations. Empowerment of the university negotiaters requires that they have some influence on the impact score of a bundle. The paper ends with a few suggestions of how extraordinarily expensive commercial publishers can be punished by redirecting the real consumers' web searches. These suggestions imply that the common pool character of the library is gradually given up.